http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63838-2002Mar8.html
The Washington Post --
The Middle East Missions
Sunday, March 10, 2002; Page B08
THE BUSH administration has rightly decided to resume its efforts to
broker an end to the mounting warfare between Israelis and Palestinians.
Now it faces a tricky task of diplomatic choreography: simultaneously
managing the mission of special envoy Anthony C. Zinni, who returns
to a conflict the administration has been reluctant to tackle, and
that of Vice President Cheney, who leaves today to advance the Bush
administration's own agenda in the Middle East -- starting with its
effort to bring change to Iraq. As a practical matter, it is impossible
to separate the two initiatives. But the administration must try to
avoid two traps that have crippled U.S. diplomacy in the past. One would
be to allow Arab states to use the Israeli-Arab dispute to avoid matters
of vital interest to the United States, such as the necessity to
confront Saddam Hussein. The other would be to reenter the Arab-Israeli
maelstrom merely as a gesture of appeasement to Arab allies, without
summoning the creativity and willingness to persevere that will now be
necessary to restart a peace process.
The moderate Arab leaders Mr. Cheney will visit clearly are appalled
and frightened by the nearly unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed,
graphic scenes of which are broadcast nightly across the region. But the
crisis has also come at a convenient moment for the Arabs, who are most
reluctant to talk with the Bush administration about a new campaign
against Iraq -- much less the political, social and economic reforms
that must be carried out in their countries if Islamic extremism and
terrorism are to be extinguished. If they could, they would speak with
Mr. Cheney exclusively about the still-sketchy peace proposal of Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah, and whether or not it will be endorsed by an
Arab summit at the end of the month. The Bush administration is right
to encourage that initiative, even if it has little chance of becoming
the vehicle of a peace settlement. But it must also press on with the
initiatives that are now central to U.S. interests after Sept. 11 --
beginning with Iraq -- and make clear to Arab allies that those initiatives
must go forward, whether or not there is progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian front.
At the same time, the seriousness of the Arab-Israeli crisis means
the administration cannot afford to dispatch Gen. Zinni once again
without giving him a chance to succeed. In the past, the Bush
administration's efforts to broker a cease-fire have failed at
least in part because of a lack of energy and staying power; its
envoys have been reluctant to pressure Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon, or hold Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat fully
accountable for his actions. The impulse has been to retreat to the
sidelines whenever one side or the other breaks a promise or behaves
badly. Meanwhile, the Bush team has refrained from creating the
outlines of a process leading to a permanent settlement that could
be offered as an alternative to the current bloodshed. Without that
prospect, moderates on both sides have been neutralized.
If it is to succeed in this intervention, the administration must
be ready to use U.S. influence to demand that both Mr. Sharon and
Mr. Arafat cease their attacks -- and that Mr. Arafat then take
decisive action against Palestinian terrorists. Israel must be made
to ease its pressure on average Palestinians and stop the provocative
acts that have contributed to the breakdown of previous cease-fires.
Mr. Arafat must understand that a failure to perform will lead to
concrete consequences, including a rupture of relations with the
United States. If a cease-fire can be obtained, the administration
needs to be ready to facilitate the quick beginning of a serious
political process, one that will draw in Arab states as well as Israel
and the Palestinians. And it must be ready to accept the fact that
even if Mr. Arafat cooperates -- and perhaps especially if he does
-- extremists will still occasionally manage to carry out acts of
terrorism. These must be energetically fought; but they cannot be
allowed to serve as a pretext for renewed warfare.
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